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JUSTICE AND OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE:
THE SMORGASBORD PLOY
Kenneth Graham*
If published cases are any indication, other crimes evidence is a
prominent feature of criminal cases in both state and federal courts. It
seems likely that such evidence can produce false convictions by leading
judges and jurors to the view expressed by Captain Renault (in the movie
Casablanca): “Round up the usual suspects!”1
The smorgasbord ploy probably plays only a minor role in the admission
of other crimes evidence. But it offers us a nice window into the uses and
abuses of Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (“the Rules”) and
its state clones.2
Rule 404(b)’s drafters may have supposed that trial judges would look
among the illustrative uses in Rule 404(b) and select the one or two that
seem most apropos to the case before them. However, the practitioners of
smorgasbordism do not make any choices but instead list all (or most) of
the illustrative uses to support the admission of the other crimes.3
We can surmise the judge calculates that this will avoid appellate reversal
by giving appellate judges more grounds for affirming a decision to admit
other crimes evidence. Moreover, it saves work; the judge need not put in
as much effort to use the ploy as she would have to in deciding which of the
adversaries has analyzed admissibility correctly.4

* Professor of Law Emeritus, UCLA School of Law.
1. CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942).
2. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (making evidence related to the defendant’s criminal history
admissible for limited purposes).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 904 F.2d 549, 555 (10th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Cook, 745 F.2d 1311, 1317 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Haskins, 737 F.2d 844, 848
(10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Cotner, 657 F.2d 1171, 1173 (10th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Logan, 641 F.2d 860, 863 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Mucci, 630 F.2d 737,
743 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Askew, 584 F.2d 960, 963 (10th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Bridwell, 583 F.2d 1135, 1140 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Gano, 560 F.2d
990, 993 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Gamble, 541 F.2d 873, 877–78 (10th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Pennick, 500 F.2d 184, 187 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Hampton, 457
F.2d 299, 302–03 (7th Cir. 1972); see also 22B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W.
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5239, at 144 (Supp. 2016).
4. As the sophisticated reader will have grasped, the trial judge does not do the work.
Instead, she dumps it off on the proponent of the other crimes evidence. While some might
argue that overburdened prosecutors lack the resources to do such work, we can respond that
they can save their time, as well as that of judges and jurors, by not relying so much on other
crimes evidence to prejudice the defense.
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While a few state and federal judges have criticized the practice,5 most
appellate judges do as trial judges expect.6 How can we account for
appellate judges’ acceptance of a practice that some judges see as an abuse?
There are many possible explanations. The first is the idea of an “old
boys club” among judges, making appellate judges reluctant to criticize by
name a lower court judge they may run into at the next judicial conclave.
Ambition may also be a factor—given the key role the Department of
Justice plays for the Senate in vetting proposed judicial appointments,7 any
judge who hopes to move up the ranks of the judiciary can hardly afford to
offend prosecutors by making it harder to get other crimes evidence before
a jury.
Judges may also suffer from class bias. Most judges come from the
upper strata of society; those against whom other crimes evidence is
admitted appear to them as losers and perhaps members of some despised
minority.8 Prosecutors seldom go after what Theodore Roosevelt called
“malefactors of great wealth.”9 Finally, judges may find it easier to go
along with well-established traditions rather than to rally support for
reforming the admission of other crimes evidence. Some judges may even
agree with the way the present system works to admit (and occasionally
exclude) other crimes evidence. The correct answer probably combines one
or more of the above causes.
How might judges and rulemakers change Rule 404(b) to reduce the
problems identified? First, they might require the trial judge to state on the
record the reasoning she uses to admit the other crimes evidence without
resorting to the forbidden propensity inference. This should not add to the
trial judge’s workload, as she could require the proponent of the evidence to
do this for her. This might have the added benefit of deterring prosecutors
from relying too heavily on other crimes evidence.

5. United States v. Steiner, 815 F.3d 128, 135–36 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that it is
improper for a trial court to cite all the reasons listed in Rule 404(b) as grounds for
admission); United States v. McGill, 815 F.3d 846, 889 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding that it is
improper to give an instruction that simply listed all the permissible purposes under Rule
404(b), as this is likely to confuse the jury about the proper use of the evidence); United
States v. Cortijo-Diaz, 875 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1989); Jones v. Hamelman, 869 F.2d 1023,
1027 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Mothershed, 859 F.2d 585, 589 (8th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1436 (10th Cir. 1985) (requiring the proponent to
state a specific purpose); Hazel v. United States, 599 A.2d 38, 44 (D.C. App. 1991); People
v. Golochowicz, 319 N.W.2d 518, 523–24 (Mich. 1982).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 303 F.3d 711, 715–17 (6th Cir. 2002). We find it
hard to document the practice because appellate opinions usually only discuss the grounds
they approve and do not mention the other grounds relied upon by the trial judge.
7. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.23 (2016). States select and promote judges by such diverse
methods that we cannot even speculate how judicial ambition plays out in the states.
8. See, e.g., Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2177 (2015) (describing the defendant as a
pimp).
9. President Theodore Roosevelt, Address on the Occasion of the Laying of the
Cornerstone of the Pilgrim Memorial Monument, Provincetown, Massachusetts 47 (Aug. 20,
1907). Prosecuting corporations that rip off consumers and taxpayers raises the difficult
question of whether corporations can have “character.”
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Second, judges and rulemakers might forbid reliance on more than one
ground, except in cases where the stated uses overlap or where the evidence
can justify more than one use. For an example of the first exception,
“motive” can be used to prove “intent.”10 As an example of the second,
that the defendant had previously stalked the victim of the charged sexual
assault could show both opportunity and identity.
Finally, evidence teachers need to do a better job teaching relevance. If
the leading casebooks are indicative of what goes on in the classroom,
many teachers do little rigorous analysis of this topic.11 As a result, many
judges and lawyers cannot detect whether the relevance of another crime
depends on the forbidden inference to propensity.

10. For example, where the motive for a killing is to prevent a witness from testifying.
11. Relevance applies to all forms of proof. For example, when a lawyer argues, “I just
want it in to show that it was said,” a cogent response asks, “Why is the fact it was said
relevant?”

